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Introduction
Telegram, a popular instant messaging (IM) service, uses AES-256 with Infinite Garble Extension (IGE) mode [1] in their customized protocol called MTProto [2] . Although Telegram is widely known as one of the most secure IM services, IGE mode is not a standard mode of operation recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [3] , nor by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) [4] . This motivates us to thoroughly examine the security of IGE mode encryption. The classical security of IGE mode was previously reviewed in [5] . To the best of our knowledge, this letter evaluates the post-quantum security of IGE mode against quantum adversaries who use the quantum computers to break our system for the first time.
Preliminaries
We consider the post-quantum security notion of indistinguishability under quantum chosen-plaintext attack (INDqCPA) [6] in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QaROM). The model uses an attack scenario where the adversary has a quantum encryption oracle access, with classical challenge queries allowed only. The following is a mathematically formulated definition [7] , whereÔ Enc k maps basis state |m, c to |m, c ⊕ Enc k (m) . 
where Succ
is as follows:
In order to prove IND-qCPA security of IGE mode, we need certain assumptions regarding the existence of pseudorandom functions, analogous to the classical case-namely, existence of standard-secure pseudorandom function (sPRF) and quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF) [8] .
The former allows quantum adversaries but limits the queries to be classical, whereas the latter allows both quantum adversaries and quantum queries, i.e. quantum superposition of inputs. The formal definitions are as follows:
For a given security parameter λ, generate key k ∈ K .
• c $ ← − Enc k (m): Before encryption, m 0 and c 0 are randomly selected from {0, 1} t as initialization vectors. For a given message m m 0 m 1 · · · m n , where n is a polynomial in t, encrypt m using k, and output a ciphertext c c 0 c 1 · · · c n ,
• m ← Dec k (c): For a given ciphertext c, decrypt c using k, and output a message m, where 
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In order to consider quantum adversaries and quantum queries, the concept of one-way to hiding (O2H) [9] is introduced in the security proofs. (x, y) until the i-th query, measure the argument of the query in the computational basis, and output the measurement outcome. Let
Then,
IND-qCPA Insecurity of IGE Mode Using a sPRF
In order to show that a sPRF is not sufficient for IND-qCPA security of IGE mode, a specific block cipher BC k () is constructed as follows:
where E : {0, 1} n−1 × {0, 1} n−1 → {0, 1} n−1 and t : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} are sPRFs, H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n is a random oracle, and k $ ← − {0, 1} n−1 is the key. Here, for a string x x 1 x 2 · · · x n , where x i is the i-th bit of x, LastBit(x) = x n and DropLastBit(x) = x 1 x 2 · · · x n−1 . For an l-bit string a and a binary variable b, a · b = a if b = 1, 0 l otherwise. In [10] , BC k () is proved to be a sPRF but not a qPRF using O2H lemma, for any quantum adversary with a classical access to BC k () and a quantum access to the random oracle H. We use this block cipher BC k for the construction of Π IGE .
Theorem 3.1:
There exists a sPRF such that Π IGE is INDqCPA insecure in the QaROM.
Proof. As in previous attacks [10] , we use Simon's algorithm [11] to attack IGE mode. The quantum adversary prepares six quantum registers, three of which store messages and the rest three store ciphertexts, as shown in Fig. 1 . The adversary then stores the superposition of all possible messages, i.e. m 2 2 −n/2 |m 2 , in the message registers using a Hadamard gate. After an encryption query is made, the corresponding reply is stored in the ciphertext registers as follows:
where |+ 2 −1/2 (|0 + |1 ). Now c 1 is XOR'ed to m 2 using a CNOT gate. More formally,
In order to use BC k 's special property of being (k 1)-periodic, we consider another message input m 2 2 −n/2 |m 2 ⊕ (k 1) . By a similar calculation as before, and using BC k (x) = BC k (x ⊕ (k 1)),
Since |ψ 3 = |φ 3 = (|ψ 3 + |φ 3 )/2, |ψ 3 is rewritten as
The state after applying Hadamard gate on |m 2 is
where denotes bitwise inner product. Finally, if we measure the m 2 register, we either get a vector z such that (k 1) z = 0, or an empty string. We repeat the same attack until we get n − 1 independent vectors, thereby recovering n − 1 bits of k and breaking Π IGE .
IND-qCPA Security of IGE Mode Using a qPRF
In order to show that IND-qCPA security of IGE mode is conditional on the existence of a qPRF, we use O2H lemma and prove the bound for any quantum adversary that attacks the system. We define . In Lemma 4.1, we prove that the probability of distinguishing the output of IGE mode's Enc i,H from that of Enc i+1,H is negligible in security parameter t.
Lemma 4.1:
For any i ∈ [0, p(t)) and every quantum adversary A that makes at most q A queries in the QaROM,
